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Pan-Africanism: A Fading Light in Africa’s Darkest Hour?

Updated: 34 minutes ago

By Dengiyefa Angalapu

 

Pan-Africanism is a movement rooted in the ideals of African unity and collective self-reliance. It emerged in response to the continent’s pillage under the slave trade, colonialism, and the racial discrimination widely faced by Africans even on African soil. The originators of the movement, namely Henry Sylvester Williams, Marcus Garvey, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Kwame Nkrumah, among others, sought to harness the collective strength of Africans to combat colonial domination, racial discrimination, and systemic inequalities. As part of the Pan-African movement, several Pan-African congresses and institutions emerged across the continent. Notable among these are the African Union (AU), which operates at the continental level, and regional organisations such as the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the East African Community (EAC), the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), the Southern African Development Community (SADC), the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU), and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). These institutions aim to foster regional cooperation and drive economic transformation across the continent.  When taken as a whole, these platforms seek to realise the pan-African vision of a freed and united continent that is economically transformed and self-sufficient


Founding Fathers of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on May 25, 1963 (Photo Credit: Black History Month 2024)

History shows that the movement has achieved some progress towards its goals. The end of the era of direct occupation by European colonial powers following Namibia’s independence in 1990, the end of Apartheid in 1994, and the global commitment against racial discrimination are all positives from the struggle against exploitation, subjugation, and racial discrimination that Pan-Africanism entails. Yet, there is a growing dissatisfaction with the ability of pan-African platforms to promote and liberate the continent. These organisations have become clubs for heads of government, focused exclusively on internal affairs while ignoring the African people's emergent external threats and developmental concerns. They have also been called dictator clubs, frequently pointing to the fact that they help members maintain their positions of authority, frequently at the expense of procedures that call into question their ongoing authority. The slack in the effectiveness of Pan-African platforms has deepened the neo-colonial pillage of Africa, a phase Nkrumah referred to as the highest stage of imperialism, characterised by power without responsibility. 


The Second Scramble: Key Actors, Actions and Impacts 


The first scramble for Africa occurred amongst European powers whose economic interests and concern for African resources resulted in the partitioning of the continent via the Berlin Conference of 1884–85. There has been a resurgence of interest in the African continent since the Second World War, the end of colonialism, and the rise of new world powers eager to strengthen their position strategically and economically. The actors have expanded from European imperialists to include new and emerging powers, namely the US, Russia, and China, among others, along with various supranational organisations that carry out their bidding. These powers affect the continent through military operations, trade agreements, loans, development grants, the acquisition of land and resources, and sometimes direct assistance in toppling long-serving incumbents. Examples of direct ‘hard’ external influences on political changes on the continent include the 2011 NATO intervention that ousted Gaddafi from Libya, the 2013 coup that ousted Morsi from Egypt, the 2017 coup that led to the resignation of Mugabe in Zimbabwe, and the 2019 coup that ousted Omar al-Bashir from Sudan, among others. Direct 'soft’ external influences have also manifested, especially through speeches like Obama’s interference during Nigeria's 2015 general elections. 


In Africa, external controls can also be implemented indirectly, particularly through conditions imposed on grants and loans.  In addition to the well-established conditionalities that the recipient government must follow, grant frameworks in international development are increasingly crafted to favour foreign development organisations, often positioning them as the primary recipients of funding under consortium arrangements. African organisations, on the other hand, are forced into lower-level positions and are responsible for the riskiest and most difficult tasks. Even when dealing with issues that have their roots in their own countries and cultural contexts, where they have firsthand knowledge and daily interaction, African professionals are often viewed as second-tier experts in these partnerships when compared to foreign expatriates. When these arrangements are critically examined, it becomes clear that the salaries, benefits, and operating expenses of foreign experts take up a sizable amount of the funds allotted for developmental projects. Therefore, rather than empowering local communities or promoting sustainable development in Africa, what is referred to as "foreign aid" frequently acts as a vehicle to generate employment opportunities for citizens of donor countries abroad. Additionally, some of these projects' methods can disregard conflict sensitivities and undermine local cultures. African societies are frequently treated as subjects for experimentation, with development strategies imposed that do not align with local realities or priorities. This top-down model marginalises African voices in decision-making but also risks perpetuating dependency rather than building capacity and resilience within the continent.  


It is worth mentioning that the activities that characterise the second scramble have yielded some positives for the continent. Notably, there have been gains for the continent’s infrastructure, and the competition for a stake in the continent has expanded options for trade. China has made substantial mining investments in Zambia and Ghana, agricultural investments in South Africa and Zambia, and even infrastructural investments in railways and roads in countries like Nigeria and Egypt. China is Africa's largest bilateral creditor, providing about 17 percent of sub-Saharan external public debt in 2021 towards funding transport, mining, and energy infrastructure. This amounted to around $134 billion. Additionally, the United States and the United Kingdom have made investments through their respective aid programmes, UKAID and USAID. For instance, the USAID Africa Trade and Investment Activity aims to strengthen the US government's capacity to increase trade in Africa by allocating $251 million in funding between 2021 and 2026.  It is also known that Japan helped build Morocco's Noor Solar Power Project and the Mombasa Port Development Project. The Japanese investment in the Moroccan solar project seeks to establish a larger solar power station with a capacity of 20 MW and a base for manufacturing Moroccan-made Concentration Photovoltaic Solar Panels for improved energy production.  


Despite the seeming advantages, the unequal trade relations arising from the second scramble have also led to the transformation of Africa into a dumping ground for toxic wastes and substandard products. Incidents like the Probo Koala Incident of 2006 in Côte d'Ivoire, the Koko Incident of 1988 in Nigeria, and the Post-Tsunami incident in Somalia are notable examples of incidents of toxic waste dumped on the continent. In contemporary times, there is a growing export of substandard electronics and food products, automotive parts, plastic and electronic wastes, and substandard clothing to African countries like Nigeria, Ghana, Kenya, and South Africa, among others. For example, it is estimated that 40% of the 15 million used garments that arrive in Accra, Ghana, each week from the UK, North America, and Australia are of such low quality that they wind up in landfills. Also, according to a 2023 United Nations Report, substandard and counterfeit pharmaceuticals from countries like China, Belgium, France, and India result in almost 500,000 deaths annually in sub-Saharan Africa and cost between $12 and $40 million.  


These instances demonstrate how the environment, human health, and even the lives of people on the African continent are negatively impacted by the unfair trade relations that define the second scramble. This is comparable to the time when the African environment was viewed as merely a place to further colonial economic objectives, with little to no consideration given to the effects that economic exchanges and activities had on the environment and human health. 

 


Plastic Waste in Dandora Slum of Nairobi, Kenya (Photo Credit: Daily Sabah)

There are serious issues with the military presence on the continent in addition to the drawbacks of foreign investment brought on by the second scramble. For example, the United States has a significant military presence in Uganda, Niger, and Somalia, where it provides military surveillance and training and conducts joint operations against extremists. The French military was also heavily represented in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Chad prior to their withdrawal. Evidence shows that there were 5,000 French troops in Mali alone, deployed to combat terrorism as part of Operation Barkhane. As of November 2023, a BBC news report indicated a presence of 1000 French troops in Chad, 1,500 French soldiers in Djibouti, 350 troops in Gabon, 950 soldiers deployed as part of Operation Licorne to Ivory Coast, and a contingent of 400 soldiers in Senegal. In reaction to the rising anti-French sentiment on the continent, the French government has recently made an effort to reduce the French military presence. This was mentioned in a proposal to reduce the number of Senegalese troops from 350 to about 100. Additionally, it was reported that French military forces in Ivory Coast were reduced from 100 to 10 and those in Chad from 1000 to 300.  


Moving beyond Europe, Chinese troops are reportedly present in Djibouti and Liberia. Russia is also involved in military operations, providing training for the armed forces of the Central African Republic and providing support for Wagner Group, now rebranded as African Corps, in an effort to expand Moscow's influence. The African nations of Libya, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, Eritrea, Djibouti, Somalia, Seychelles, Madagascar, Botswana, Democratic Republic of Congo, and Central African Republic were listed in a 2019 Institute of Security Studies publication as having a known foreign military presence. Senegal, Ghana, Burkina Faso, Gabon, Côte d'Ivoire, and Cameroon. Across these areas, there is a presence of the military from Belgium, Italy, Turkey, China, Japan, the United Arab Emirates, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, India, Saudi Arabia, and the United States. 


Chinese Mercenaries in Africa (Photo Credit: Today News Africa)

Concerns regarding a covert goal of waging proxy wars and maintaining a smooth operation of the extractive industry are the root of the problem with the presence of foreign military forces. For example, there are reports that the Russian military frequently targets areas with profitable extractive industries. In addition, all of the foreign countries with active militaries listed above rank among the richest in Africa in terms of natural resources. Additionally, there is an abundance of weapons on the continent, many of which come from outside sources. For example, China accounted for 19%, Russia accounted for 17%, France accounted for 11%, the US accounted for 4.6%, and Germany accounted for 0.4% of arms exports to Sub-Saharan Africa between 2019 and 2023. Also, within this period, Turkey and Belarus were the fourth and sixth largest suppliers of arms to sub-Saharan Africa. These weapons intensify humanitarian crises, destabilise governments, and fuel wars. For instance, the Sahel region has become a major hub for illicit arms trafficking, with weapons such as AK-pattern assault rifles and smuggled French and Turkish machine guns being readily available. But while the role of outside forces in sustaining these conflicts is conveniently disregarded, Africa is routinely criminalised for its internal conflict. More so, the case of Libya exemplifies the disastrous consequences of foreign intervention. In the name of democracy and human rights, NATO-backed operations led to the ousting of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. However, Libya remains a fractured state, plagued by civil war, human trafficking, and terrorism, with both democracy and human rights remaining a dream that may not come to fruition any time soon. 

 

What Reaction Have Pan-African Platforms Had? 


The issues arising from the second scramble closely mirror the experience of the African continent under colonialism and earlier phases of imperialism. The advantages of infrastructure and trade relations are very similar to those of colonialism, when infrastructure was purposefully built to support colonial powers, and the disadvantages are indistinguishable from the legacy of colonialism, which included subjugation, dominance, and exploitation. The experiences largely validate concerns about neo-colonialism and justify the intensification of efforts towards the total liberation of the continent via pan-African rhetoric, mobilisation, and interventions. 


Platforms and organisations that should defend the continent's interests and work towards its liberation have been reluctant to oppose foreign influence, despite the overwhelming evidence for renewed and revitalised pan-African agency in the face of a second race for the continent. More so, internal sources of funds for these organisations are inadequate to allow for independence and spirited actions towards achieving desired pan-African ideals. More than 40% of member states of the AU do not make annual contributions. It took China to fund and build the African Union headquarters. This characteristic is not exclusive to the AU; it is also present in regional platforms that heavily rely on external funding, such as the ECOWAS. 


Together with the region's generally low level of development, these problems fuel mistrust of foreign relations, provide an excuse for uprisings against domestic governments, and even lessen the power of already-existing pan-African organisations. Concerns regarding the negative effects of the second scramble on African people and economies are raised by the widespread use of anti-West populist rhetoric to defend the recent return of military rule on the continent. Three Sahelian countries—Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger—left ECOWAS on the grounds that they were acting under the influence of foreign powers and posing a threat to other members, a phenomenon known as the Sahel-Exit. Many people believe that the African Union and other regional organisations that should support African cooperation towards full liberation and promote the idea of decolonisation have devolved into a club of current and former political leaders who have no real commitment to the pan-African cause. The silence of these organisations in the face of growing adverse impacts of the second scramble for the continent betrays a disconnect with the pan-African ideals and aspirations. 


Even the organisations from which they originated exhibit a noticeable disconnection from indigenous African development initiatives, which further demonstrates the pan-African associations' disconnection from pan-African ideals. Domestic peacekeeping efforts have been understaffed and underfunded over the years. The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) and other initiatives aimed at enhancing the calibre of African governments have been abandoned, and the AU Agenda 2063, a domestic development agenda, hardly gets the same attention as the UN's SDGs. The implications are that the pan-African platforms are, at best, neutral observers as the world struggles to control the continent’s destiny. 


Conclusion and the Way Forward 


During the first scramble for Africa, the continent's lack of Western education and exposure may have provided some excuse for its disadvantage. However, no such justification exists today. This is not a call for Pan-African platforms to embrace hostility towards non-African nations and institutions; rather, it is an appeal to ensure that Africa is strategically positioned to critically engage in its relationships rather than merely remaining a passive recipient of external influences. Pan-African platforms must rise to the challenge of resisting the exploitation, subjugation, pillage, and unequal trade relations that persist between Africa and the rest of the world. It is imperative to move beyond being mere producers of raw materials for foreign industries while importing finished goods. The continent must have the guts to break off or reinterpret exploitative ties with foreign powers and create indigenous solutions for issues like industrialisation and production, institutional reforms and governance frameworks, philanthropy, and conflict resolution, among other things.  


Overall, despite the many internal challenges, particularly in leadership, Pan-African platforms cannot afford to overlook the threats posed by external actors. They must also boldly confront and denounce the environmental and sociopolitical damage inflicted on Africa by foreign interests. African leaders need to be strong negotiators who demand justice on important issues like climate change, which has wreaked havoc on the continent despite Africa's small share of global carbon emissions. Pan-African platforms must draw their legitimacy from the people, not just from governments, ensuring that Africans view institutions like the African Union (AU) and regional organisations as champions of their interests rather than exclusive clubs for the elite. The silence of Pan-African institutions amidst a new scramble for Africa is a profound betrayal of the movement's founding principles. While the challenges Africa faces are vast and complex, they are not insurmountable. To overcome them, Pan-Africanism must be revitalised as a force for internal transformation and a safeguard against external exploitation. 

 

Dengiyefa Angalapu is a Political Scientist currently serving as a Research Analyst at the Centre for Democracy and Development. He is also a Research Fellow at the SOAS Centre for Pan African Studies in London. Dengiyefa is interested in addressing developmental challenges in the Global South. His research primarily explores conflicts related to natural resource management, including violence induced by climate change, crude oil disputes, and mining-related conflicts. Dengiyefa's expertise also extends to security sector reform, maritime security, terrorism, environmental politics, and sustainability. 


In addition, Dengiyefa is dedicated to promoting Pan Africanism, democracy and human rights through his writing and advocacy. With extensive experience as a researcher, he has conducted significant studies on violence in West Africa, providing valuable insights into these issues. 

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